first depositor
An accounting flaw: the protocol's internal bookkeeping (share price, balances, health checks) can be corrupted so an attacker withdraws more value than they put in.
The execution result
What this class of bug is
An accounting flaw: the protocol's internal bookkeeping (share price, balances, health checks) can be corrupted so an attacker withdraws more value than they put in. This is the class behind real on-chain losses in this category.
The receipt
The verifiable artifact — the verdict, the class, the clean-control result, and the attribution — as a signed record. The exploit method itself is withheld (defensive); what you verify is that the proof is genuine and untampered.
Verify this yourself
You don't have to trust us. Every receipt is a leaf in an append-only, hash-chained, Merkle-rooted log. Verify the chain and recompute the root — it must match what we publish on /stats:
curl -s https://omniguardlabs.com/proofs/verify_root.py -o verify_root.py curl -s https://omniguardlabs.com/proofs/proof_log.jsonl | python3 verify_root.py -
Get your own contract proven — not guessed
Static tools and LLM auditors ask “is there a check here?” and miss the check that exists but is wrong. We run the exploit on a fork and send you a signed pass/fail receipt. Request a proof-backed audit →